1. What Iran offered, and why Washington said no
The offer came in two steps. On 22 September a senior Iranian official told Reuters that Tehran could reopen the strait within seven days if the United States eased military pressure and lifted the blockade (Israel Hayom citing Reuters). On 25 September Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi presented the worked-out roadmap at the UN General Assembly: release of frozen Iranian funds, an end to oil sanctions and an end to the naval blockade, steps he said could be done in four to five days, with the strait reopened and final negotiations started on day seven (Al Jazeera). According to CBS News the package also covered a ceasefire across every front in the region, Lebanon included, with Qatar, Oman and UN officials in the middle.
President Trump rejected it on 26 September in front of reporters: "I'm rejecting their deal," adding that Iran wanted an agreement only "because they are losing so badly" (CBS News). The United States, he said, controls the strait (Times of Israel). The Wall Street Journal has reported that Trump told aides he expects to resume bombing after the November midterm elections (cited by Times of Israel). Araghchi's reply on 27 September: Iran will not back down on its conditions, only a negotiated settlement can end the stand-off, and Tehran is waiting for the mediators to relay Washington's final position (Al Jazeera, CBS News).
As of 2 October: the reply is in, the deal is not, and the threats are growing sharper. Araghchi met the Qatari mediators in New York on 28 September and expected the formal US reply by Tuesday (Al Jazeera). Trump told Axios the same day: "They want to make a deal, but it is not the deal that I want to make", and denied any concession: "I offered them NOTHING!"; a US official called the indirect talks "positive and constructive" but said there would be no deal unless the nuclear issues were addressed (CBS News). The reply arrived on 30 September via Qatar: according to Gulf News the two sides largely agree on the required steps but remain divided over their sequencing, in other words over who moves first. Iran's demands stand: an end to the naval blockade, sanctions waivers, release of about $12 billion in frozen assets and a regional ceasefire including Lebanon; Washington wants a comprehensive package that covers the nuclear programme (Al Jazeera). Araghchi: "We are fully prepared for the time for the war to be resumed" (Al Jazeera).
Since the US reply the tone has hardened on both sides. Iran threatened on 29 September: chief negotiator and parliament speaker Ghalibaf said that in a region where Iran cannot sell oil, nobody else will sell oil either, and that if Iran's security is not guaranteed, no infrastructure will remain safe; the Revolutionary Guards spokesman, Mohebbi, said: “Any vessel attempting to pass through sustains damage, either we strike it, or it hits a mine” (Times of Israel). The US side counters that it has the strait under control (Times of Israel, 26 September); the Revolutionary Guards explicitly called it “closed” on 29 September and disputed that account (Times of Israel). On 1 October Trump said: “We have to make that decision: We blow them up or make a deal” and “It's gonna end very soon, one way or the other”; whether bombing resumes after the election on 3 November he left open. The carrier group around USS Theodore Roosevelt left San Diego on 27 September and is due in the Arabian Sea between late October and late November, to join USS George H.W. Bush and USS George Washington (Gulf News). On 1 October a tanker in the Strait of Hormuz was also hit by an unknown projectile; it caught fire, the crew was unhurt and no one was named as responsible (UKMTO via Asharq Al-Awsat).
So the seven-day offer has failed, but the channel is open and the gap narrower than a week ago. The two sides read the situation in opposite ways: Washington sees Iran under pressure with no reason to be given concessions, Tehran sees the next move as Washington's. The record argues for caution either way. After the failed Islamabad talks the United States imposed its naval blockade in April, a memorandum did emerge in June, and on 8 July the ceasefire broke down again (Wikipedia, 2026 Strait of Hormuz campaign).
2. What actually flows through Hormuz today
On the flow figures the strait is not shut, but it is a bottleneck, and for crude the flow has recovered: Kpler counted 13.5 million barrels a day of crude through Hormuz on 28 September, which IBTimes describes as the pre-war level; refined products, by contrast, managed only 677,000 barrels a day on a seven-day average, against 3.6 million before the war (Kpler via IBTimes UK, 1 October). The figures rest on different bases and must not be set against each other: 13.5 million is a daily reading for crude, while the September average was about 9.72 million barrels a day after a low of 2.2 million in July (Splash247 citing Kpler, 30 September). Goldman Sachs estimated at the end of September that about 23 million barrels a day leave the Middle East via Hormuz and alternative routes, close to pre-war levels (Bloomberg via Rigzone, 30 September); on 20 September CENTCOM put the strait at about 10 million, with Iran itself exporting zero barrels and the main lanes cleared of mines (Admiral Brad Cooper, Business Standard citing Bloomberg). Passage is not safe: on 29 September the British UKMTO reported two ships hit by projectiles, and on 1 October a tanker was struck by an unknown projectile, caught fire, the crew was unhurt and no one was named as responsible (UKMTO via Gulf News and Asharq Al-Awsat). Who controls the strait is disputed: the US side says it has it under control, while the Revolutionary Guards called it “closed” on 29 September and disputed that account (Times of Israel). The picture is not uniform: on 30 September Gulf News still described crude, products and gas as well below normal, with shipowners demanding high risk premiums. Before the war the strait handled about 125 large merchant ships a day (Israel Hayom) and roughly a fifth of global oil and LNG trade (EnergyNow). The gap is what the world market has been covering since March with stock draws, pipelines and higher US exports.
The bypass routes are themselves under fire. Saudi Arabia's East-West pipeline, which together with the UAE bypass carried around 5 million barrels a day around Hormuz in the second quarter (Fortune/McKinsey, 17 September), was knocked out by drones in mid-September and has been running at about half capacity again since the end of September; tankers are being loaded at Yanbu once more (Reuters via The Nation, 29 September). According to Kpler, Saudi Arabia exported about 5.4 million barrels of crude a day in September after 2.45 million in August, with about 2.65 million going through Yanbu, heading towards 3 to 4 million; the Gulf states together reached 16.33 million barrels a day, the highest since the war began at the end of February, against 19.51 million in February (Splash247 citing Kpler, 30 September). Brent fell 2.6 per cent to $102.59 on 29 September. On 24 September Saudi air defences intercepted six Houthi ballistic missiles aimed at Taif province and the Yanbu area, the pipeline's Red Sea terminal, and Brent rose 3.4 per cent that day (Reuters via Investing.com). On 26 September drones targeted Riyadh and a missile flew towards Khamis Mushait; all were intercepted (Times of Israel). The EIA's outlook of 9 September assumes constraints lasting into the second quarter of 2027 (EIA STEO). Our glossary entry on the Strait of Hormuz explains why the waterway matters this much.
3. Three scenarios after the rejection
Scenario 1, stalemate: the rejection stands, the mediators keep working, and the strait stays a bottleneck that the US side calls controlled and the Revolutionary Guards called “closed” on 29 September (Times of Israel). That is where things stand on 2 October, now with a US reply on the table. The week after the rejection showed what this scenario looks like: Brent jumped more than four dollars in early trade on 28 September and settled only about one per cent higher at $105.28 as Qatar announced separate talks (investingLive); on the 29th it fell 2.6 per cent to $102.59 as Saudi Arabia resumed exports via Yanbu (Reuters via The Nation); on the 30th the expiring November contract settled at $103.53 and the December contract at $98.03 (Bloomberg via Rigzone); on 1 October the December contract jumped 4.37 per cent to $102.31 after Chinese refiners suspended product exports other than to Hong Kong and Macau until further notice, according to four people familiar with the matter and without official confirmation from China (Reuters via Dawn); at 13:14 on 2 October it stood at $100.03 (HeizOel24.ch), and in the afternoon it briefly fell below $99 (Trading Economics), after the G7 decided to release 100 million barrels through the IEA, starting immediately and spread over four months, with a “substantial” share of diesel in the first 20 days (The Irish Times, 16:25). Supply pushes down, diplomacy holds the premium, and news such as the Chinese export halt or the G7 decision on reserves moves the price by several dollars within a day; Brent stays well above the summer but far below the monthly high near $110. For heating oil this means a high price with no clear direction: German heating oil at €164.57 per 100 litres at 12:24 on 2 October (HeizOel24), French ordinaire at €1,849 per 1,000 litres on 1 October (prixfioul.fr).
Scenario 2, a deal after all: crude reacts first and hardest. When reports of an agreement circulated on 12 June, Brent fell 3.37 per cent in one session to $87.33 (Yahoo Finance); Goldman Sachs put the value of a normalisation one month earlier at roughly $10 a barrel for late 2026 (Yahoo Finance, 21 June). Diesel and heating oil would follow more slowly, because US distillate stocks are at their lowest September level since 1982 (EnergyNow) and Russia's diesel export ban runs to the end of October (Hydrocarbon Processing). Gas would move with oil, because a reopening would bring Qatari LNG back.
Scenario 3, escalation: attacks on ships, pipelines or ports, or a return to air strikes. The market knows the pattern from the summer: after the ceasefire broke on 8 July, Brent climbed from $71.57 on 1 July to $96.78 on 24 July, and the year's high was $118.35 on 31 March (Wikipedia). This time diesel rather than crude would lead, because stocks are empty and on 26 September Ukrainian drones halted the Ilsky refinery in Russia's Krasnodar region, which produces nearly 6.6 million tonnes of fuel a year (Kyiv Independent). The political risk is now spelled out: Trump left open on 1 October whether to resume attacks after the election on 3 November, and a third aircraft carrier, USS Theodore Roosevelt, is due in the Arabian Sea between late October and late November (Gulf News); Iran threatened on 29 September to attack infrastructure and ships (Times of Israel), and on 1 October a tanker was hit (UKMTO via Asharq Al-Awsat). Which scenario plays out will be settled between Washington, Tehran and the mediators, not on the exchange; our Oil price today page keeps the daily reading.
4. What to do now, and what not to do
Do not trade on headlines, but take note that the picture has turned: the one piece of news that could make heating oil cheaper in the short run, a Hormuz deal, has not been off the table since Trump's no of 26 September, but it has no date: the US reply of 30 September settles the steps, not their order (Gulf News). If your tank is below a third, order; heating oil follows crude with a lag of days, and dealers pass on falls more slowly than rises (see pass-through effect). Above two thirds you can wait, but you are no longer waiting for a deadline, only for talks without a date. For orientation: heating oil cost on average €164.57 per 100 litres in Germany at 12:24 on 2 October for a 3,000-litre order (HeizOel24) and €1,849 per 1,000 litres ordinaire in France on 1 October (prixfioul.fr). The full rule with every threshold is on Heating oil: buy now or wait?, and the Northeast outlook on Northeast heating oil forecast.
For diesel users relief comes more slowly whatever happens, for the reasons set out on our page about the diesel shortage of winter 2026/27. For gas customers in Europe the question is whether things calm down before winter: German storage stood at 57.7 per cent in the latest reading (Federal Network Agency, via ZDFheute of 30 September), and minister Reiche has ordered Sefe to buy and store eight terawatt hours of gas by 15 December because of continuing geopolitical risks (ZDFheute); details on gas storage and winter 2026/27. The broader status of the crisis is on our Hormuz crisis hub.
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