Update, 2 October 2026: a contested coastline and attacks on Saudi Arabia
Houthi forces took stretches of Yemen's Red Sea coast in September 2026, including Mokha, but to hold those gains they need the mountainous high ground overlooking Bab el-Mandeb and the roads leading inland, and their attempts to take that high ground have so far failed (Al Jazeera, 1 October 2026). That is a narrower description than the reports of 11 and 12 September quoted in section 3, which spoke of the entire Yemeni coast; the 1 October report is headlined as government forces holding the line, so the strait's Yemeni shore is better read as contested than as settled.
Attacks on Saudi Arabia have continued, and each side's account is given here as its own claim. The Saudi-led coalition said a power distribution station in Medina was attacked on Tuesday, 29 September, putting one transformer out of service without affecting the wider grid, and that drone wreckage confirmed Houthi involvement; the Houthis called the accusation a lie, and Al Jazeera could not verify it independently (Al Jazeera, 1 October 2026). On the evening of 1 October the coalition said it intercepted four drones and two ballistic missiles aimed at Khamis Mushait and Jazan; debris from one missile damaged buildings and vehicles in Khamis Mushait, and Saudi Civil Defense reported no casualties (Arab News, 1 October 2026). Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman told the Shura Council on 30 September that the kingdom would respond firmly to any attack, pointed to a multinational defensive maritime coalition set up to protect international waterways, and cited the defence agreement with Türkiye and Pakistan formalised in August (Al Jazeera, 30 September 2026).
The Saudi bypass this page tracks below is running again. Saudi crude exports reached about 5.4 million barrels a day in September after 2.45 million in August; the Red Sea port of Yanbu loads about 2.65 million barrels a day, rising toward 3 to 4 million; and Gulf crude exports as a whole reached 16.33 million barrels a day, the highest since the war began in late February, against 19.51 million in February (Kpler via Splash247, 30 September 2026). With more Saudi oil leaving through the Red Sea, attacks on that route matter more for prices, not less. Why diesel and heating oil stay tight even as crude flows recover is covered on our diesel shortage winter 2026/27 page.
1. The short answer
The Bab el-Mandeb strait is not formally closed, but the Houthi movement now controls Yemen's shore of the strait and the islands inside it, and Red Sea shipping traffic is running roughly 60% below its level before the late-2023 attacks. On 11 September 2026, Houthi forces took the port of Mokha and the rest of Yemen's Red Sea coast, and by 12 September 2026 they controlled the Hanish islands and Mayyun, also called Perim, in the strait's narrowest section (Al Jazeera, 11 and 12 September 2026). No UKMTO, IMO, US MARAD or government notice has declared the strait closed; the MARAD advisory through 22 September 2026 describes high risk, not closure.
This is a status page, not a forecast. It sits alongside our Strait of Hormuz status hub, the reference for the Gulf chokepoint.
2. Where the numbers stand
Bab el-Mandeb carries less oil than the Strait of Hormuz but feeds the same route toward Suez, so a slowdown here shows up mainly in shipping cost.
| Indicator | Value | As of | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bab el-Mandeb oil transit | 4.2 million b/d, versus 9.3 million b/d in 2023 | H1 2025 (updated 3 March 2026) | EIA World Oil Transit Chokepoints |
| Strait of Hormuz oil transit, for comparison | 20.9 million b/d, about five times the Bab el-Mandeb volume | H1 2025 | EIA |
| Red Sea shipping traffic | About 60% below pre-late-2023 levels | 12 September 2026 | Reuters and AP via Voice of Emirates |
| Saudi Red Sea crude exports | Fallen from 3.8 to 2.2 million b/d | 12 September 2026 | Voice of Emirates, citing Reuters and AP |
| Suez Canal transits and revenue since start of 2026 | 1,315 ships, $449 million (versus 1,243 ships, $368 million a year earlier) | 9 February 2026 | Suez Canal chief Osama Rabie via Egypt Today |
| Suez container capacity offered | 292,000 TEU a month, versus 4.1 million TEU a month in 2023 | 2025 (published 21 January 2026) | Xeneta |
| Drewry World Container Index | $4,476 per 40-foot container | 10 September 2026 | Drewry via The DCN |
| War risk insurance, Red Sea passage | 0.2% of ship value calm, 0.7% to 1.0% after incidents, per roughly seven-day passage | 9 February 2026 | Ship Universe |
| Displacement | Over 46,000 people displaced by the coastal offensive | reported 11 September 2026 | UN, via dpa |
The strait's width is reported two ways: dpa gives roughly 20 kilometers (11 September 2026), standard references give 26 kilometers, so treat it as 20 to 26 kilometers.
3. Who controls what, since when
The territorial picture changed fast in early September 2026.
- 20 July 2026. The Houthi movement declares a naval blockade against Saudi Arabia.
- 24 July 2026. Reporting describes the blockade as aimed specifically at Saudi-flagged vessels, not shipping in general.
- 10 September 2026. The port city of Mokha, on Yemen's Red Sea coast, falls to Houthi forces (Al Jazeera, 11 September 2026).
- 11 September 2026. Houthi forces take Mayyun (Perim) island and Yemen's whole Red Sea coastline across six districts. dpa-AFX reports the strait stays navigable, but that the Houthis can now "attack or disrupt ships more precisely than before." The Houthi Political Bureau calls navigation and trade in the Red Sea "safe and orderly."
- 12 September 2026. Al Jazeera reports Houthi forces now control the Hanish islands, Mayyun and the entire Yemeni coast. Analyst Wolfgang Pusztai says the Houthis have "the real capability to shut down any maritime traffic through Bab al-Mandeb if they want to," a capability, not a declared closure.
Both readings are given side by side rather than resolved. No UKMTO, IMO, US MARAD or government notice has declared Bab el-Mandeb closed as of 12 September 2026, and the 20 July 2026 blockade targeted Saudi-flagged ships specifically.
4. The Saudi bypass: the East-West Pipeline
Saudi Arabia's main alternative to shipping crude past Bab el-Mandeb is the East-West Pipeline, also called Petroline, and it was shut down as a precaution on 11 September 2026 after a drone attack. The line runs 1,201 kilometers from the Abqaiq field to the Red Sea terminal at Yanbu. Capacity was 5 million b/d in 2018, with an expansion to 7 million b/d announced by Aramco in August 2019; dpa reported on 12 September 2026 that it can carry "up to seven million barrels a day," while Al Jazeera said the same day it had most recently carried 4 to 5 million b/d, or 4% to 5% of global supply.
The attack used several drones targeting the Riyadh and Medina regions; Saudi Arabia's foreign ministry said they "originated from Iraq, resulting in injuries and material damage" (Al Jazeera and Gulf News, 11 September 2026). The energy ministry called the shutdown "stopped as a precaution." No group claimed responsibility; a group calling itself the Islamic Resistance in Iraq denied involvement.
Not the first strike: an earlier attack on 10 April 2026 hit facilities in the Eastern Province, Riyadh and Yanbu, cutting throughput by roughly 700,000 b/d, with Saudi production down about 600,000 b/d (Malay Mail, 10 April 2026). A separate Hormuz bypass, ADCOP, from Habshan to Fujairah, has a capacity of 1.5 million b/d (EIA, 17 August 2012).
5. The long way round: diverting via the Cape of Good Hope
Shipping lines rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope face a trade-off measurable in miles, days and dollars. The Red Sea route between Asia and Europe is more than 3,000 nautical miles and roughly 10 days shorter than the Cape route (ING Research via South China Morning Post, accessed 12 September 2026). Surinder Brrar of Hong Kong Polytechnic University put the extra cost of the Cape diversion at roughly $30 to $50 per twenty-foot container in the same report.
A UNCTAD 2024 analysis quantifies the knock-on effects: a Singapore to Rotterdam round trip via the Cape runs about 29% longer, an India to Europe round trip stretches from 56 to 63 days, and emissions per Singapore to Northern Europe round trip run more than 70% higher. Contract rates from the Far East to Northern Europe were $2,010 per unit as of 21 January 2026, 58% above end-2023, and $2,308 to the Mediterranean, 45% above end-2023 (Xeneta).
War risk insurance for a Red Sea passage runs about 0.2% of ship value calm, 0.7% to 1.0% after an incident (Ship Universe, 9 February 2026). These costs explain why container capacity offered through Suez fell to about 292,000 TEU a month in 2025, against 4.1 million TEU a month in 2023 (Xeneta), even though the canal stayed open, logging 1,315 transits by 9 February 2026 (Egypt Today).
6. What it means for diesel and heating oil
The clearest, most dated link between the Red Sea crisis and a European fuel bill runs through India's diesel exports. Indian refineries supplied about 60% of the diesel shipped through Bab el-Mandeb toward Europe in August 2026, roughly 200,000 barrels a day (Business Today, 6 September 2026). That volume grew partly because Russian seaborne diesel exports fell: in the first 25 days of August 2026 they averaged 150,000 b/d, down 610,000 b/d from a year earlier. India's refining capacity stood at 258.1 million tonnes a year (Business Today).
This flow sits alongside the pricing mechanics on our other pages: refiners price diesel off a margin over crude, explained in our diesel crack spread entry and refining margin entry, a margin already elevated by the separate disruption on our Hormuz status hub. How that reaches a household bill is on our US diesel and heating oil prices page and pass-through effect entry; European gas storage, the floor under winter heating costs, is in our EU gas storage entry.
See how a change in fuel costs could move your own winter budget.
Run the calculator7. Where to go next
This hub tracks the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb side of the 2026 disruption. For the Gulf side and the pricing mechanics behind any chokepoint, see:
- Strait of Hormuz status hub, the sister page to this one.
- Diesel crack spread, the refining margin formula behind diesel prices.
- US diesel and heating oil prices, for the household bill.
- EU gas storage, for the winter gas picture in Europe.